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ʻO ka puʻupuʻu haʻalulu no HOME security

ʻO ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia he ʻāpana koʻikoʻi o ka mālama ʻana i ka pono palekana o kā mākou ʻōnaehana palekana palekana (SIS) a me nā ʻōnaehana e pili ana i ka palekana (e laʻa me nā ʻōkuhi koʻikoʻi, nā ʻōnaehana ahi & kinoea, nā ʻōnaehana interlock instrumented, etc.). ʻO ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia he hoʻāʻo maʻamau e ʻike i nā hemahema pōʻino, e hoʻāʻo i nā hana e pili ana i ka palekana (e laʻa, hoʻihoʻi, bypasses, alarms, diagnostics, manual shutdown, etc.) ʻO nā hopena o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia he ana hoʻi ia o ka pono o ka papahana integrity mechanical SIS a me ka hilinaʻi kahua o ka ʻōnaehana.

Hoʻopili nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i nā hana hoʻāʻo mai ka loaʻa ʻana o nā ʻae, ka hoʻolaha ʻana a me ka lawe ʻana i ka ʻōnaehana i waho o ka lawelawe no ka hoʻāʻo ʻana e hōʻoia i ka hoʻāʻo piha ʻana, ka palapala ʻana i ka hōʻike hōʻoia a me kāna mau hopena, hoʻihoʻi i ka ʻōnaehana i ka lawelawe, a me ka loiloi ʻana i nā hopena hōʻike o kēia manawa a me nā hōʻike mua. nā hopena hoʻokolohua.

ANSI/ISA/IEC 61511-1, Paukū 16, uhi i ka ho'āʻo hōʻoia SIS. ʻO ka hōʻike ʻenehana ISA TR84.00.03 - "Mechanical Integrity of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)," uhi i ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia a ke nānā ʻia nei me kahi mana hou i manaʻo ʻia e puka koke ʻia. ʻO ka hōʻike ʻenehana ISA TR96.05.02 - "In-situ Proof Testing of Automated Valves" i kēia manawa ke kūkulu ʻia nei.

Hōʻike ʻo UK HSE CRR 428/2002 - "Nā kumu no ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia o nā ʻōnaehana mea hana palekana i ka ʻoihana kemika" hāʻawi i ka ʻike e pili ana i ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia a me nā ʻoihana e hana nei ma UK.

Hoʻokumu ʻia kahi kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i ka nānā ʻana i nā ʻano hana pōʻino i ʻike ʻia no kēlā me kēia ʻāpana o ke ala huakaʻi palekana (SIF), ka hana SIF ma ke ʻano he ʻōnaehana, a pehea (a inā) e hoʻāʻo ai no ka pōʻino hiki ʻole. ʻano hana. Pono e hoʻomaka ka hoʻomohala ʻana i ke kaʻina hana ma ka pae hoʻolālā SIF me ka hoʻolālā ʻōnaehana, ke koho ʻana i nā ʻāpana, a me ka hoʻoholo ʻana i ka wā a pehea e hōʻoia ai i ka hōʻike. Loaʻa i nā mea kani SIS nā pae like ʻole o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia e pono e noʻonoʻo ʻia ma ka hoʻolālā SIF, hana a mālama. No ka laʻana, ʻoi aku ka maʻalahi o ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i nā mika orifice a me nā mea hoʻouna kaomi ma mua o nā mīkini kahe nui o Coriolis, nā mika mag a i ʻole nā ​​​​mea ʻike kiʻekiʻe o ka radar. Hiki i ka noi a me ka hoʻolālā valve ke hoʻopili i ka piha o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia valve e hōʻoia i ka hiki ʻole o ka pōʻino a me ka hoʻomaka ʻana ma muli o ka hoʻohaʻahaʻa ʻana, ka hoʻopili ʻana a i ʻole nā ​​​​hopena pili i ka manawa ʻaʻole ia e alakaʻi i kahi hemahema koʻikoʻi i loko o ka wā hoʻāʻo i koho ʻia.

ʻOiai e hoʻomohala mau ʻia nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i ka wā ʻenekinia SIF, pono e loiloi ʻia lākou e ka pūnaewele SIS Technical Authority, Operations a me nā ʻenehana mea hana e hana ana i ka hoʻāʻo. Pono e hana ʻia kahi loiloi palekana hana (JSA). He mea nui e kiʻi i ke kūʻai ʻana o ka mea kanu i nā hoʻokolohua e hana ʻia a i ka manawa, a me ko lākou kino a palekana. No ka laʻana, ʻaʻole maikaʻi ke kuhikuhi ʻana i ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka hapa-stroke i ka wā e ʻae ʻole ai ka hui Operations e hana. Manaʻo pū ʻia e nānā ʻia nā kaʻina hana hōʻoia e kahi loea kumuhana kūʻokoʻa (SME). Hōʻike ʻia ka hoʻāʻo maʻamau i koi ʻia no kahi hōʻike hōʻoia holoʻokoʻa ma ke Kiʻi 1.

Nā koi hoʻāʻo hōʻoia hana piha Kiʻi 1: ʻO kahi kikoʻī hoʻāʻo hōʻoia hana piha no kahi hana palekana palekana (SIF) a me kāna ʻōnaehana palekana palekana (SIS) pono e wehewehe a kuhikuhi paha i nā ʻanuʻu i ke kaʻina mai ka hoʻomākaukau ʻana a me nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo a hiki i nā hoʻolaha a me nā palapala. .

Kiʻi 1: ʻO kahi kikoʻī hoʻāʻo hōʻoia hana piha no kahi hana palekana (SIF) a me kāna ʻōnaehana palekana palekana (SIS) pono e wehewehe a kuhikuhi paha i nā ʻanuʻu i ke kaʻina mai ka hoʻomākaukau hoʻāʻo a me nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo a hiki i nā hoʻolaha a me nā palapala.

ʻO ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia he hana mālama i hoʻolālā ʻia e hana ʻia e nā limahana mākaukau i aʻo ʻia i ka hoʻāʻo SIS, ke kaʻina hana hōʻoia, a me nā puka lou SIS e hoʻāʻo ai lākou. Pono e hele i ke kaʻina hana ma mua o ka hana ʻana i ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia mua, a me ka manaʻo i ka pūnaewele SIS Technical Authority ma hope no ka hoʻomaikaʻi ʻana a i ʻole nā ​​hoʻoponopono.

ʻElua mau ʻano hemahema mua (palekana a pōʻino paha), i māhele ʻia i ʻehā mau ʻano - ʻike ʻole ʻia ka pōʻino, ʻike ʻia ka pōʻino (e nā diagnostics), ʻike ʻole ʻia a palekana. Hoʻohana ʻia nā huaʻōlelo pōʻino a ʻike ʻole ʻia i loko o kēia ʻatikala.

Ma ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia SIF, makemake nui mākou i nā ʻano hana pōʻino i ʻike ʻole ʻia, akā inā he mau diagnostics mea hoʻohana e ʻike i nā hemahema pōʻino, pono e hoʻāʻo ʻia kēia mau diagnostics. E hoʻomanaʻo, ʻaʻole e like me ka diagnostics mea hoʻohana, ʻaʻole hiki ke hōʻoia ʻia nā diagnostics kūloko ma ke ʻano he hana e ka mea hoʻohana, a hiki i kēia ke hoʻololi i ke kumu hoʻāʻo hōʻoia. Ke lawe ʻia ka hōʻaiʻē no ka diagnostics ma nā helu SIL, pono e hoʻāʻo ʻia nā ʻōhua diagnostic (e laʻa me nā ʻōhua waho waho) ma ke ʻano o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia.

Hiki ke hoʻokaʻawale ʻia nā ʻano hemahema i nā mea i hoʻāʻo ʻia i ka wā o kahi hōʻike hōʻoia, nā mea i hoʻāʻo ʻole ʻia, a me nā hāʻule hoʻomaka a i ʻole nā ​​hāʻule pili i ka manawa. ʻAʻole hiki ke hoʻāʻo pololei ʻia kekahi mau ʻano hana pōʻino no nā kumu like ʻole (e laʻa me ka paʻakikī, ka ʻenekinia a i ʻole ka hoʻoholo ʻana i ka hana, ka ʻike ʻole, ka hemahema, ka haʻalele ʻana a i ʻole ke kōmike ʻana i nā hewa systematic, haʻahaʻa haʻahaʻa o ka hiki ʻana, etc.). Inā ʻike ʻia nā ʻano hemahema ʻaʻole e hoʻāʻo ʻia, pono e hana ʻia ka uku no ka hoʻolālā ʻana i ka mea hana, ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo, ka hoʻololi ʻana a i ʻole ke kūkulu hou ʻana, a/a i ʻole ka hoʻāʻo inferential e hōʻemi i ka hopena ma ka SIF kūpaʻa ʻole o ka hoʻāʻo ʻana.

He kūlana hoʻohaʻahaʻa a kūlana hoʻohaʻahaʻa paha ka hāʻule ʻana o ka hoʻomaka ʻana e hiki ke manaʻo ʻia e hiki mai ka pōʻino koʻikoʻi inā ʻaʻole i hana ʻia nā hana hoʻoponopono i ka manawa kūpono. ʻIke pinepine ʻia lākou e ka hoʻohālikelike hana i nā hōʻike hōʻike hōʻike hōʻike mua a i ʻole nā ​​​​hōʻike hōʻike hōʻike mua (e laʻa me nā pūlima valve a i ʻole nā ​​manawa pane valve) a i ʻole ma ka nānā ʻana (e laʻa me ke awa kaʻina hana i hoʻopili ʻia). ʻO nā hemahema o ka hoʻomaka ʻana e pili ana i ka manawa - ʻo ka lōʻihi o ka lawelawe ʻana o ka hāmeʻa a i ʻole ka hui ʻana, ʻoi aku ka maikaʻi o ka hoʻohaʻahaʻa ʻana; ʻO nā kūlana e hoʻomaʻamaʻa i ka hāʻule ʻole e lilo i mea ʻoi aku ka nui, ka hana ʻana i ka port plugging a i ʻole ke kūkulu ʻana i ka sensor i ka manawa, ua pau ke ola pono, a pēlā aku. Pono e ho'āʻo ʻia nā pale i nā hemahema i hoʻomaka ʻia (ka hoʻomaʻemaʻe ʻana i ke awa, ka huli ʻana i ka wela, etc.).

Pono e kākau ʻia nā kaʻina hana i ka hōʻike hōʻoia no nā hemahema (ʻike ʻole ʻia). Hiki ke kōkua i nā ʻano hana hāʻule ʻole a me ka nānā ʻana i ka hopena (FMEA) a i ʻole ke ʻano hemahema, hopena a me ka diagnostic analysis (FMEDA) i ka ʻike ʻana i nā hemahema ʻike ʻole ʻia, a kahi e hoʻomaikaʻi ʻia ai ka uhi hoʻāʻo hōʻoia.

Nui nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i kākau ʻia ma muli o ka ʻike a me nā laʻana mai nā kaʻina hana e kū nei. Kāhea nā kaʻina hana hou a me nā SIF paʻakikī i kahi ala ʻenehana hou me ka hoʻohana ʻana i FMEA/FMEDA no ka nānā ʻana i nā hemahema pōʻino, e hoʻoholo i ke ʻano o ke kaʻina hana hoʻokolohua e hoʻāʻo ai no kēlā mau hemahema, a me ka uhi o nā hoʻokolohua. Hōʻike ʻia kahi kiʻi paʻi kiʻi paʻi kiʻekiʻe macro-level no ka mea ʻike ma ke Kiʻi 2. Pono e hana ʻia ka FMEA i hoʻokahi wale nō ʻano o ka mea hana a hoʻohana hou ʻia no nā mea like me ka noʻonoʻo ʻana i kā lākou lawelawe kaʻina hana, hoʻonohonoho a me nā hiki ke hoʻāʻo i ka pūnaewele. .

Kiʻi 2: ʻO kēia kiʻi paʻi kiʻi paʻi kiʻekiʻe macro-level no ka sensor a me ka mea hoʻouna kaomi (PT) e hōʻike ana i nā hana nui e hoʻokaʻawale ʻia i loko o nā loiloi micro failure e wehewehe piha i nā hemahema hiki ke hoʻoponopono ʻia. ma na hoao hana.

Kiʻi 2: Hōʻike kēia kiʻi paʻi kiʻi macro-level failure mode analysis block for a sensor and pressure transmitter (PT) i nā hana koʻikoʻi e hoʻokaʻawale ʻia i loko o nā loiloi micro failure e wehewehe piha i nā hemahema hiki ke hoʻoponopono ʻia i nā hoʻokolohua hana.

ʻO ka pākēneka o nā hemahema i ʻike ʻia, pōʻino, ʻike ʻole ʻia i hoʻāʻo ʻia e kapa ʻia ʻo ka proof test coverage (PTC). Hoʻohana mau ʻia ka PTC i nā helu SIL e "uku" no ka hiki ʻole ke hoʻāʻo piha i ka SIF. Ua kuhi hewa ka poʻe no ka mea ua noʻonoʻo lākou i ka nele o ka uhi hoʻāʻo i kā lākou helu SIL, ua hoʻolālā lākou i kahi SIF hilinaʻi. ʻO ka ʻoiaʻiʻo maʻalahi, inā ʻo 75% kāu uhi hoʻāʻo, a inā ʻoe i helu i kēlā helu i kāu helu SIL a hoʻāʻo i nā mea āu e hoʻāʻo pinepine nei, hiki i ka 25% o nā hemahema pōʻino ke hiki i ka helu helu. ʻAʻole wau makemake e komo i kēlā 25%.

Hāʻawi nā hōʻike apono FMEDA a me nā manual palekana no nā hāmeʻa i kahi kaʻina hana hōʻoia hōʻoia liʻiliʻi a me ka uhi hoʻāʻo hōʻoia. Hāʻawi kēia i ke alakaʻi wale nō, ʻaʻole nā ​​ʻanuʻu hoʻāʻo a pau i koi ʻia no kahi kaʻina hana hōʻoia hōʻoia piha. Hoʻohana ʻia nā ʻano ʻano loiloi hemahema, e like me ka nānā ʻana i ka lāʻau hewa a me ka mālama pono ʻana i ka hilinaʻi, e hoʻohana ʻia no ka nānā ʻana no nā hemahema pōʻino.

Hiki ke hoʻokaʻawale ʻia nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i ka hana piha (end-to-end) a i ʻole ka hoʻāʻo hana ʻāpana (Figure 3). Hana ʻia ka hoʻāʻo haʻahaʻa haʻahaʻa inā loaʻa i nā ʻāpana o ka SIF nā manawa hoʻāʻo ʻokoʻa i nā helu SIL ʻaʻole i laina me nā pani pani ʻana a i ʻole ka huli ʻana. He mea nui ka ho'āʻo ʻana i nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo ʻokoʻa e hoʻāʻo pū ai i nā hana palekana āpau o ka SIF. Me ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka hana ʻāpana, ʻōlelo ʻia e loaʻa i ka SIF kahi hōʻoia hōʻoia hope-a-hope, a me nā mea ma hope i ka wā o ka huli ʻana.

Pono e hoʻohui ʻia nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia hapa Kiʻi 3: Pono nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ʻāpana i hui ʻia (lalo) e uhi i nā hana āpau o kahi hōʻike hōʻoia hana piha (luna).

Kiʻi 3: Pono nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ʻāpana hui (lalo) e uhi i nā hana āpau o kahi hōʻike hōʻoia hana piha (luna).

Hoʻāʻo ʻia kahi hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ʻāpana i ka pākēneka o nā ʻano hemahema o kahi hāmeʻa. ʻO kahi laʻana maʻamau, ʻo ia ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka valve-stroke valve, kahi e hoʻoneʻe ʻia ai ka valve i kahi liʻiliʻi (10-20%) e hōʻoia ʻaʻole i paʻa. He haʻahaʻa haʻahaʻa kēia ma mua o ka hōʻike hōʻike ma ka wā hoʻāʻo mua.

Hiki i nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ke ʻokoʻa i ka paʻakikī me ka paʻakikī o ka SIF a me ke kaʻina hana hoʻokolohua ʻoihana. Ke kākau nei kekahi mau ʻoihana i nā kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo i kēlā me kēia pae, aʻo nā mea ʻē aʻe he mau kaʻina hana pōkole. Hoʻohana ʻia nā kuhikuhi i nā kaʻina hana ʻē aʻe, e like me ka calibration maʻamau, i kekahi manawa e hōʻemi i ka nui o ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia a kōkua i ka hōʻoia ʻana i ka hoʻāʻo ʻana. Pono ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia maikaʻi e hāʻawi i nā kikoʻī kūpono e hōʻoia i ka hoʻokō pono ʻana o nā hoʻāʻo a pau a kākau ʻia, akā ʻaʻole nui nā kikoʻī e hiki ai i nā ʻenehana ke makemake e lele i nā ʻanuʻu. Loaʻa ka ʻenehana, nona ke kuleana no ka hana ʻana i ka ʻanuʻu hoʻāʻo, ʻo ka hoʻomaka ʻana i ka pae hoʻāʻo i hoʻopau ʻia hiki ke kōkua i ka hōʻoia e hana pololei ʻia ka hoʻāʻo. ʻO ka hoʻopaʻa inoa ʻana i ka hōʻike hōʻoia i hoʻopau ʻia e ka Luna Hoʻokele Instrument a me nā ʻelele Operations e koʻikoʻi i ka mea nui a hōʻoia i kahi hōʻike hōʻoia i hoʻopau pono ʻia.

Pono e kono ʻia nā manaʻo loea e kōkua i ka hoʻomaikaʻi ʻana i ke kaʻina hana. ʻO ka holomua o kahi kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia aia ma ka hapa nui o nā lima technician, no laila makemake nui ʻia ka hoʻoikaika ʻana.

Hana ʻia ka hapa nui o nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ma waho o ka laina i ka wā o ka pani ʻana a i ʻole ka huli ʻana. I kekahi mau hihia, koi ʻia ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia e hana ma ka pūnaewele ʻoiai e holo ana e hoʻokō i nā helu SIL a i ʻole nā ​​​​koi ʻē aʻe. Pono ka hoʻāʻo ʻana ma ka pūnaewele i ka hoʻolālā a me ka hui pū ʻana me Operations e ʻae i ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia e hana me ka palekana, me ka ʻole o kahi kaʻina hana, a me ka ʻole o ka huakaʻi hoʻopunipuni. Hoʻokahi wale nō huakaʻi hoʻopunipuni e hoʻohana i kāu mau attaboys āpau. I loko o kēia ʻano o ka hoʻāʻo, ke loaʻa ʻole ka SIF e hoʻokō i kāna hana palekana, 61511-1, Paukū 11.8.5, ʻōlelo ʻo "E hāʻawi ʻia nā hana uku e hōʻoia ai i ka hoʻomau ʻana i ka hana palekana e like me 11.3 i ka wā o ka SIS i loko. bypass (hoʻoponopono a hoʻāʻo paha). Pono ke kaʻina hana hoʻokele kūlana ʻino me ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia e kōkua i ka hana pono ʻana o kēia.

Hoʻokaʻawale ʻia kahi SIF i ʻekolu mau ʻāpana nui: nā mea ʻike, nā mea hoʻoponopono loiloi a me nā mea hope. Aia kekahi mau mea kōkua maʻamau i hiki ke hoʻopili ʻia i loko o kēlā me kēia ʻāpana ʻekolu (e laʻa i nā pale IS, nā amps huakaʻi, nā relays interposing, solenoids, etc.) pono e hoʻāʻo ʻia. Hiki ke loaʻa nā ʻano koʻikoʻi o ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i kēlā me kēia ʻenehana ma ka ʻaoʻao ʻaoʻao, "Nā mea ʻike hoʻāʻo, nā mea hoʻoponopono loiloi a me nā mea hope" (ma lalo).

ʻOi aku ka maʻalahi o ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i kekahi mau mea ma mua o nā mea ʻē aʻe. Nui nā ʻenehana hou a me nā mea kahiko a me nā ʻenehana pae i ka ʻāpana paʻakikī. ʻO kēia mau mea me nā mīkini kahe Coriolis, nā mika vortex, nā mika mag, ka radar ma o ka lewa, ka pae kani ultrasonic, a me nā hoʻololi kaʻina hana in-situ, e inoa i kekahi. ʻO ka mea pōmaikaʻi, ua hoʻonui ka nui o kēia mau diagnostics e hiki ai i ka hoʻāʻo maikaʻi.

Pono e noʻonoʻo ʻia ka paʻakikī o ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i kēlā ʻano mea ma ke kula ma ka hoʻolālā SIF. He mea maʻalahi no ka ʻenekinia ke koho i nā mea SIF me ka noʻonoʻo ʻole i nā mea e pono ai e hōʻoia i ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka hāmeʻa, ʻoiai ʻaʻole lākou ka poʻe e hoʻāʻo iā lākou. He ʻoiaʻiʻo nō hoʻi kēia i ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka hapa-stroke, he ala maʻamau ia e hoʻomaikaʻi ai i ka SIF awelika o ka hiki ʻole o ke koi (PFDavg), akā ma hope o ka mea kanu ʻaʻole makemake ʻo Operations e hana, a ʻaʻole paha. Hāʻawi mau i ka nānā ʻana i nā mea kanu o ka ʻenekinia o nā SIF e pili ana i ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia.

Pono e komo i loko o ka ho'āʻo hōʻoia ka nānā ʻana i ka hoʻokomo ʻana a me ka hoʻoponopono ʻana o SIF e like me ka mea e pono ai e hālāwai me 61511-1, Paukū 16.3.2. Pono e nānā hope ʻia e hōʻoia i ka pihi ʻana o nā mea a pau, a me ka hōʻoia pālua ua hoʻihoʻi pono ʻia ka SIF i ka lawelawe kaʻina.

ʻO ke kākau ʻana a me ka hoʻokō ʻana i kahi kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo maikaʻi kahi hana koʻikoʻi e hōʻoia i ka pono o ka SIF i kona wā e ola ana. Pono ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo e hāʻawi i nā kikoʻī kūpono e hōʻoia i ka hana mau ʻana a me ka palekana o nā hoʻokolohua i koi ʻia. Pono e uku ʻia nā hāʻule pōʻino ʻaʻole i hoʻāʻo ʻia e nā hōʻike hōʻoia e hōʻoia i ka mālama pono ʻana o ka palekana palekana o SIF i kona wā e ola ana.

Pono ke kākau ʻana i kahi kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia maikaʻi i ka loiloi ʻenekinia o nā hemahema pōʻino, ke koho ʻana i nā ala, a me ke kākau ʻana i nā ʻanuʻu hōʻike hōʻoia i loko o ka hiki ke hoʻāʻo o ka mea kanu. Ma ke ala, e kiʻi i nā mea kanu kūʻai-ma nā pae āpau no ka hoʻāʻo ʻana, a hoʻomaʻamaʻa i nā technicians e hana a palapala i ka hōʻike hōʻoia a hoʻomaopopo pū i ke koʻikoʻi o ka hoʻāʻo. E kākau i nā ʻōlelo aʻo me he mea lā ʻo ʻoe ke ʻenehana mea hana e hana i ka hana, a ke hilinaʻi nei ke ola i ka hoʻāʻo pono ʻana, no ka mea.

Testing sensors, logic solvers and final elements A SIF is typically divided up into three main parts, sensors, logic solvers and final elements. There also typically are auxiliary devices that can be associated within each of these three parts (e.g. I.S. barriers, trip amps, interposing relays, solenoids, etc.) that must also be tested.Sensor proof tests: The sensor proof test must ensure that the sensor can sense the process variable over its full range and transmit the proper signal to the SIS logic solver for evaluation. While not inclusive, some of the things to consider in creating the sensor portion of the proof test procedure are given in Table 1. Table 1: Sensor proof test considerations Process ports clean/process interface check, significant buildup noted Internal diagnostics check, run extended diagnostics if available  Sensor calibration (5 point) with simulated process input to sensor, verified through to the DCS, drift check Trip point check High/High-High/Low/Low-Low alarms Redundancy, voting degradation  Out of range, deviation, diagnostic alarms Bypass and alarms, restrike User diagnostics Transmitter Fail Safe configuration verified Test associated systems (e.g. purge, heat tracing, etc.) and auxiliary components Physical inspection Complete as-found and as-left documentation Logic solver proof test:  When full-function proof testing is done, the logic solver’s part in accomplishing the SIF’s safety action and related actions (e.g. alarms, reset, bypasses, user diagnostics, redundancies, HMI, etc.) are tested. Partial or piecemeal function proof tests must accomplish all these tests as part of the individual overlapping proof tests. The logic solver manufacturer should have a recommended proof test procedure in the device safety manual. If not and as a minimum, the logic solver power should be cycled, and the logic solver diagnostic registers, status lights, power supply voltages, communication links and redundancy should be checked. These checks should be done prior to the full-function proof test.Don’t make the assumption that the software is good forever and the logic need not be tested after the initial proof test as undocumented, unauthorized and untested software and hardware changes and software updates can creep into systems over time and must be factored into your overall proof test philosophy. The management of change, maintenance, and revision logs should be reviewed to ensure they are up to date and properly maintained, and if capable, the application program should be compared to the latest backup.Care should also be taken to test all the user logic solver auxiliary and diagnostic functions (e.g. watchdogs, communication links, cybersecurity appliances, etc.).Final element proof test: Most final elements are valves, however, rotating equipment motor starters, variable-speed drives and other electrical components such as contactors and circuit breakers are also used as final elements and their failure modes must be analyzed and proof tested.The primary failure modes for valves are being stuck, response time too slow or too fast, and leakage, all of which are affected by the valve’s operating process interface at trip time. While testing the valve at operating conditions is the most desirable case, Operations would generally be opposed to tripping the SIF while the plant is operating. Most SIS valves are typically tested while the plant is down at zero differential pressure, which is the least demanding of operating conditions. The user should be aware of the worst-case operational differential pressure and the valve and process degradation effects, which should be factored into the valve and actuator design and sizing.Commonly, to compensate for not testing at process operating conditions, additional safety pressure/thrust/torque margin is added to the valve actuator and inferential performance testing is done utilizing baseline testing. Examples of these inferential tests are where the valve response time is timed, a smart positioner or digital valve controller is used to record a valve pressure/position curve or signature, or advance diagnostics are done during the proof test and compared with previous test results or baselines to detect valve performance degradation, indicating a potential incipient failure. Also, if tight shut off (TSO) is a requirement, simply stroking the valve will not test for leakage and a periodic valve leak test will have to be performed. ISA TR96.05.02 is intended to provide guidance on four different levels of testing of SIS valves and their typical proof test coverage, based on how the test is instrumented. People (particularly users) are encouraged to participate in the development of this technical report (contact crobinson@isa.org).Ambient temperatures can also affect valve friction loads, so that testing valves in warm weather will generally be the least demanding friction load when compared to cold weather operation. As a result, proof testing of valves at a consistent temperature should be considered to provide consistent data for inferential testing for the determination of valve performance degradation.Valves with smart positioners or a digital valve controller generally have capability to create a valve signature that can be used to monitor degradation in valve performance. A baseline valve signature can be requested as part of your purchase order or you can create one during the initial proof test to serve as a baseline. The valve signature should be done for both opening and closing of the valve. Advanced valve diagnostic should also be used if available. This can help tell you if your valve performance is deteriorating by comparing subsequent proof test valve signatures and diagnostics with your baseline. This type of test can help compensate for not testing the valve at worst case operating pressures.The valve signature during a proof test may also be able to record the response time with time stamps, removing the need for a stopwatch. Increased response time is a sign of valve deterioration and increased friction load to move the valve. While there are no standards regarding changes in valve response time, a negative pattern of changes from proof test to proof test is indicative of the potential loss of the valve’s safety margin and performance. Modern SIS valve proof testing should include a valve signature as a matter of good engineering practice.The valve instrument air supply pressure should be measured during a proof test. While the valve spring for a spring-return valve is what closes the valve, the force or torque involved is determined by how much the valve spring is compressed by the valve supply pressure (per Hooke’s Law, F = kX). If your supply pressure is low, the spring will not compress as much, hence less force will be available to move the valve when needed. While not inclusive, some of the things to consider in creating the valve portion of the proof test procedure are given in Table 2. Table 2: Final element valve assembly considerations Test valve safety action at process operating pressure (best but typically not done), and time the valve’s response time. Verify redundancy Test valve safety action at zero differential pressure and time valve’s response time. Verify redundancy  Run valve signature and diagnostics as part of proof test and compare to baseline and previous test Visually observe valve action (proper action without unusual vibration or noise, etc.). Verify the valve field and position indication on the DCS Fully stroke the valve a minimum of five times during the proof test to help ensure valve reliability. (This is not intended to fix significant degradation effects or incipient failures). Review valve maintenance records to ensure any changes meet the required valve SRS specifications Test diagnostics for energize-to-trip systems Leak test if Tight Shut Off (TSO) is required Verify the command disagree alarm functionality Inspect valve assembly and internals Remove, test and rebuild as necessary Complete as-found and as-left documentation Solenoids Evaluate venting to provide required response time Evaluate solenoid performance by a digital valve controller or smart positioner Verify redundant solenoid performance (e.g. 1oo2, 2oo3) Interposing Relays Verify correct operation, redundancy Device inspection

Hoʻokaʻawale ʻia kahi SIF i ʻekolu mau ʻāpana nui, nā mea ʻike, nā mea hoʻoponopono loiloi a me nā mea hope. Aia nō kekahi mau mea kōkua i hiki ke hoʻopili ʻia i loko o kēlā me kēia ʻāpana ʻekolu (e laʻa i nā pale IS, nā amps huakaʻi, nā relays interposing, solenoids, etc.) pono e hoʻāʻo ʻia.

Nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia sensor: Pono ka hōʻike hōʻike sensor e hiki ke ʻike i ke ʻano o ke kaʻina hana ma luna o kona laulā piha a hoʻouna i ka hōʻailona kūpono i ka SIS logic solver no ka loiloi. ʻOiai ʻaʻole i komo, aia kekahi o nā mea e noʻonoʻo ai i ka hana ʻana i ka ʻāpana sensor o ke kaʻina hana hōʻoia hōʻoia i hāʻawi ʻia ma ka Papa 1.

Ho'āʻo hōʻoia Logic solver proof: Ke hoʻokō ʻia ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia holoʻokoʻa, hoʻāʻo ʻia ka ʻāpana o ka mea hoʻoponopono loiloi i ka hoʻokō ʻana i ka hana palekana o ka SIF a me nā hana e pili ana (e laʻa me nā alarms, reset, bypasses, diagnostics user, redundancies, HMI, etc.). Pono nā ho'āʻo hōʻoia hana ʻāpana a ʻāpana paha e hoʻokō i kēia mau hoʻāʻo ʻana ma ke ʻano he ʻāpana o nā hoʻāʻo hōʻoia overlapping. Pono ka mea hana hoʻoponopono logic i kahi kaʻina hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i ʻōlelo ʻia ma ka manual palekana. Inā ʻaʻole a me ka liʻiliʻi loa, pono e hoʻokele ʻia ka mana logic solver, a pono e nānā ʻia ka logic solver diagnostic registers, nā kukui kūlana, nā uila lako mana, nā loulou kamaʻilio a me ka redundancy pono e nānā ʻia. Pono e hana ʻia kēia mau loiloi ma mua o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia piha.

Mai noʻonoʻo i ka maikaʻi o ka polokalamu a ʻaʻole pono e hoʻāʻo ʻia ka loiloi ma hope o ka hōʻike hōʻike mua ʻana ma ke ʻano he undocumented, ʻae ʻole a hoʻāʻo ʻole ʻia nā polokalamu a me nā hoʻololi ʻana i nā lako polokalamu hiki ke kolo i nā ʻōnaehana i ka manawa a pono e helu ʻia i loko o kāu holoʻokoʻa. philosophy test proof. Pono e nānā ʻia ka hoʻoponopono ʻana i nā lāʻau hoʻololi, mālama ʻia, a me ka hoʻoponopono hou ʻana i mea e hōʻoia ʻia ai lākou i kēia manawa a mālama pono ʻia, a inā hiki, e hoʻohālikelike ʻia ka polokalamu noi me ka waihona hope loa.

Pono e ho'āʻo i nā mea kōkua a me nā hana diagnostic (e laʻa me nā ʻīlio kiaʻi, nā loulou kamaʻilio, nā mea hana cybersecurity, etc.).

ʻO ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ʻana o ka element hope: ʻO ka hapa nui o nā mea hope he valve, akā naʻe, hoʻohana ʻia nā mea hoʻomaka kaʻa kaʻa kaʻa, nā kaʻa kaʻa hoʻololi-wikiwiki a me nā mea uila ʻē aʻe e like me nā mea hoʻopili a me nā mea haʻihaʻi kaapuni i hoʻohana ʻia ma ke ʻano he mea hope loa a pono e nānā ʻia nā ʻano hemahema a hoʻāʻo ʻia.

Hoʻopili ʻia nā ʻano hana hemahema o nā valve, lohi a wikiwiki paha ka manawa pane, a me ka leakage, nā mea a pau e pili ana i ke kaʻina hana o ka valve i ka manawa huakaʻi. ʻOiai ʻo ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i ka valve i nā kūlana hana ʻo ia ka hihia i makemake nui ʻia, e kūʻē ʻo Operations i ka hoʻokuʻu ʻana i ka SIF i ka wā e hana ana ka mea kanu. Hoʻāʻo pinepine ʻia ka hapa nui o nā valves SIS i ka wā e iho ana ka mea kanu i ke kaomi ʻokoʻa ʻole, ʻo ia ka liʻiliʻi loa o nā kūlana hana. Pono ka mea hoʻohana e hoʻomaopopo i ka pilikia ʻoi loa o ka hana ʻokoʻa a me ka valve a me ke kaʻina hana i nā hopena degradation, pono e hoʻopili ʻia i loko o ka valve a me ka hoʻolālā actuator a me ka nui.

Commonly, to compensate for not testing at process operating conditions, additional safety pressure/thrust/torque margin is added to the valve actuator and inferential performance testing is done utilizing baseline testing. Examples of these inferential tests are where the valve response time is timed, a smart positioner or digital valve controller is used to record a valve pressure/position curve or signature, or advance diagnostics are done during the proof test and compared with previous test results or baselines to detect valve performance degradation, indicating a potential incipient failure. Also, if tight shut off (TSO) is a requirement, simply stroking the valve will not test for leakage and a periodic valve leak test will have to be performed. ISA TR96.05.02 is intended to provide guidance on four different levels of testing of SIS valves and their typical proof test coverage, based on how the test is instrumented. People (particularly users) are encouraged to participate in the development of this technical report (contact crobinson@isa.org).

Hiki ke hoʻopili i nā haʻahaʻa haʻalulu valve, no laila ʻo ka hoʻāʻo ʻana i nā kiwi i ka wā mahana ʻo ia ka haʻahaʻa haʻahaʻa liʻiliʻi loa ke hoʻohālikelike ʻia me ka hana anu. ʻO ka hopena, pono e noʻonoʻo ʻia ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia ʻana o nā kiwi ma kahi mahana maʻamau e hāʻawi i ka ʻikepili kūlike no ka hoʻāʻo inferential no ka hoʻoholo ʻana i ka hoʻohaʻahaʻa ʻana o ka hana valve.

Loaʻa i nā valve me nā kūlana akamai a i ʻole ka mea hoʻoponopono valve kikohoʻe ke hana i kahi pūlima valve i hiki ke hoʻohana ʻia e nānā i ka hoʻohaʻahaʻa ʻana i ka hana o ka valve. Hiki ke noi ʻia kahi pūlima valve baseline ma ke ʻano he ʻāpana o kāu kauoha kūʻai a i ʻole hiki iā ʻoe ke hana i kekahi i ka wā o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia mua e lilo i kumu kumu. Pono e hana ʻia ka pūlima valve no ka wehe ʻana a me ka pani ʻana o ka valve. Pono e hoʻohana i ka diagnostic valve holomua inā loaʻa. Hiki ke kōkua iā ʻoe e haʻi iā ʻoe inā e pōʻino ana kāu hana valve ma ka hoʻohālikelike ʻana i nā pūlima hoʻāʻo hoʻāʻo hope a me nā diagnostics me kāu baseline. Hiki i kēia ʻano hoʻāʻo ke kōkua i ka hoʻopaʻi ʻana no ka hoʻāʻo ʻole ʻana i ka valve i nā pilikia hana ʻino loa.

Hiki ke hoʻopaʻa i ka manawa pane me nā kaha manawa, e wehe i ka pono no kahi wati. ʻO ka hoʻonui ʻia ʻana o ka manawa pane he hōʻailona ia o ka hoʻohaʻahaʻa ʻana o ka valve a me ka hoʻonui ʻia ʻana o ka friction e hoʻoneʻe i ka valve. ʻOiai ʻaʻohe kūlana e pili ana i ka hoʻololi ʻana i ka manawa pane valve, ʻo ke ʻano maikaʻi ʻole o ka hoʻololi ʻana mai ka hōʻike hōʻoia a i ka hōʻike hōʻoia e hōʻike ana i ka nalowale o ka palena palekana o ka valve a me ka hana. Pono ka hoʻāʻo ʻana o ka valve SIS hou i kahi pūlima valve ma ke ʻano o ka hana ʻenekinia maikaʻi.

Pono e ana ʻia ke kaomi ʻana i ka ea i ka wā o ka hoʻāʻo hōʻoia. ʻOiai ʻo ka pūnāwai pahu no ka pahu puna-hoʻi ka mea e pani ai i ka pahu, ʻo ka ikaika a i ʻole ka torque e pili ana e hoʻoholo ʻia e ka nui o ka pūnāwai valve i hoʻokomo ʻia e ke kaomi hoʻolako valve (ma ke kānāwai Hooke, F = kX). Inā haʻahaʻa kāu hoʻolako ʻana, ʻaʻole e hoʻopiʻi ka pūnāwai e like me ka nui, no laila ʻoi aku ka liʻiliʻi o ka ikaika e hoʻoneʻe i ka valve inā pono. ʻOiai ʻaʻole i hoʻokomo ʻia, aia kekahi o nā mea e noʻonoʻo ai i ka hana ʻana i ka ʻāpana valve o ke kaʻina hana hoʻāʻo hōʻoia i hāʻawi ʻia ma ka Papa 2.
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